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cash for shareholders in the United States. The tests are conducted with the methodology of Faulkender 
& Wang (2006) with a total sample of 2679 firms and 25720 firm-years. This study adds to earlier 
literature by showing that the shareholders of an average firm value extra cash higher during the 
financial crisis due to more restricted access to debt, lower expectations of future income, increase in 
short-term debt and decrease in new equity issuance. After the crisis, the value of cash has since 
decreased below the levels of the pre-crisis period. I also find, that the cash is valued lower for 
constrained firms during the crisis due to lower investment activity and relatively higher debt and 
interest expenses. Unconstrained firms do not face similar changes and their cash is valued higher 
during the crisis period. The findings imply that these results for constrained and unconstrained firms 
are only temporary due to the crisis, as after the crisis the differences in value of cash between 
constrained and unconstrained firms present similar results with the earlier literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Sánchez & Yurdagul (2013) present two main reasons why firms hold on to cash: precautionary motives 
and repatriation taxes. The first reason includes the transactional motives; cash holdings provide 
flexibility for firms to take on to value-creating investments. Moreover, firms might hold cash as a buffer 
for future uncertainty and to issue debt with better terms. The second reason implies that firms might 
hold on to cash due to uncertainty in fiscal policies. They also cite Bates, Kahle & Stulz (2009) who 
present that the increase in cash holdings before the financial crisis have mostly related to 
precautionary motives. 
Financial crisis of 2008 had large effects to the financial markets. Between 2008 and 2009, the S&P 500 
index decreased 46% causing panic amongst investors. Furthermore, the increased failures of banks 
during the crisis led to tightened terms in loans and decrease in new debt issued. Thus, access to capital 
markets became more restricted between years 2007 and 2009. Following Acharya, Gujral, Kulkarni & 
Shin (2011) and Shleifer & Vishny (2010), I define the financial crisis to date between 2007 and 2009. 
The existing literature contains multiple studies about the marginal value of cash for shareholders. This 
thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of financial crisis and its aftermath 
to the marginal value of corporate cash holdings for shareholders. Moreover, this paper studies the 
effects of the crisis on the marginal value of cash for the financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. This thesis concentrates on firms from the United States. Corporate governance is also worth 
studying, but as it is beyond the scope of this thesis, I have not included corporate governance in this 
paper. 
This thesis studies four different hypotheses. First, I study how the financial crisis affected the marginal 
value of cash. Second, I study how the marginal value of cash has changed after the financial crisis. The 
tests are conducted with linear regressions, with the first one containing 1869 firms and 13119 firm-
years and the second containing 2677 firms and 20671 firm-years. Third, I move on to study a more 
specific occurrence; whether the financial crisis affected differently to financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Finally, I study if these differences are only temporary due to the crisis. I use similar 
methodology as in the first tests to study the last two hypotheses. I expect the marginal value of 
corporate cash for shareholders to increase in general during the financial crisis and then decrease 
below the levels of 2001-2006. Moreover, I expect that during an economic crisis, a dollar is valued 
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higher in an unconstrained firm than in a constrained firm. However, I expect this to be only temporary 
due to the financial crisis and therefore to return to the situation before the financial crisis. Finally, I 
repeat the tests replacing cash holdings with excess cash holdings to assign robustness. 
After this introduction, my thesis is structured in the following sections.  In the second section I review 
existing literature and develop my hypotheses. Third section presents the data and methods for my 
research. In the fourth section, I present the results for the methods and data. In the fifth section, I 
examine my results through alternative methods to assign robustness. Finally, I conclude the findings 
of my thesis in the sixth chapter. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Michael Faulkender and Rong Wang discussed the value of corporate cash holdings for shareholders in 
their paper published in 2006. They find, that the rising cash levels and leverage decrease the marginal 
value of extra cash significantly. As a firm raises its debt, larger part of cash holdings are used to cover 
the interest expenses and debt reductions. Faulkender & Wang (2006), Denis & Sibilkov (2009) & Tong 
(2011) find that firms facing financial constraints have their extra cash holdings valued higher than firms 
without these constraints due to more difficulty in accessing external capital. 
As argued in the Introduction section, access to capital markets became more restricted during the 
financial crisis. Ivashina & Scharfstein (2008) find a 37% decrease in new loans for large firms during the 
peak of financial crisis. Shleifer & Vishny (2010) also acknowledge the impaired access to debt markets 
during the financial crisis. Kahle & Stulz (2013) find that during the crisis new equity issuance decreased. 
If access to capital markets is restricted, firms might not be able to take on positive NPV investments as 
they might not find the needed funding. Moreover, firms had to rely more on their internal sources of 
funding. Rehman (1998) cites Greenwald & Stiglitz (1988), Bernanke & Gertler (1989) and Calomiris & 
Hubbard (1990) in his book Financial Crisis Management in Regional Blocs. They find that during a sharp 
decline in the stock market, the expectations of future income cash flows are lower. Furthermore, 
Harford, Klasa & Maxwell (2013) present in their study that the value of cash is higher for companies 
holding debt with shorter maturity. Fosberg (2013) finds that during the financial crisis, firms increase 
their short-term debt whereas long-term debt is seen more undesired. 
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 Therefore, due to harder access to capital markets, increased short-term debt compared to long-term 
debt and the lower expectations of future income, the marginal value of cash should increase during 
time of economical crisis. Also, the panic caused by the financial crisis could have affected the 
shareholders to value extra cash higher due to precautionary and safety reasons. 
Hypothesis 1: The marginal value of cash increases during the financial crisis 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2013) find that after the financial crisis, an 87% increase in abnormal 
cash holdings has occurred compared to before the crisis. Indeed, in the data sample I used in this 
paper, the average cash-to -asset for the average firm has increased 31,5% from the start of my sample 
period to the end of my sample period. Moreover, David Stockman (2016) emphasizes the increase in 
corporate leverage. After the corporate leverage took a slight decrease during the financial crisis, in the 
recent years it has increased and bypassed the levels before the financial crisis.  Also, Fosberg (2013) 
finds that firms from the United States increase their long-term debt issuance compared to short-term 
debt. Gutierrez & Philippon (2007) argue that there has been declining competition in the United States 
which has also led to lower investments. They show that the net investment of U.S. firms has not 
managed to grow on the levels before the financial crisis. Bates et al. (2009) present that the increase 
in cash holdings is mostly related to precautionary motives.  If there are less value-creating investments 
in the future, the increase in the cash holdings should not be reasoned with transactional motives. 
Moreover, I see that the levels of cash holdings have risen over their optimal limits.  
I argument that due to abnormal cash holdings, increased long-term debt and the lack of value-creating 
investment opportunities the marginal value of cash should decrease after the financial crisis compared 
to before the crisis. Also, due to increases in cash holdings and leverage and the findings of Faulkender 
& Wang (2006) presented in the beginning of this section, the difference in the value of cash between 
the mean firm and a firm with zero cash and no leverage should be higher than earlier. 
Hypothesis 2: The marginal value of cash decreases after the financial crisis  
As presented in the beginning of this section, multiple studies indicate that extra cash is valued higher 
for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) emphasize 
that firms more likely to have financial constraints save a greater portion of their cash flow as cash. 
Consistently, Hadlock & Pierce (2010) find that firms with more cash are more likely to be constrained.  
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Campello, Graham and Harvey discuss the effects of financial crisis to financially constrained firm in 
their paper published in 2009. They find, that as constrained firms had inabilities to raise capital, 
financial crisis caused 86% of constrained firms to bypass attractive investments during the crisis. 
However, due to increase in cash holdings, I argument that the investments were bypassed due to 
precautionary and safety motives of cash holdings and not due to the lack of capital resulting from 
harder access to capital markets. Also, Kim & Park (2015) find that the KZ index, which captures the 
distress aspect of constrained firms, indicates that constrained firms reduce debt rather than invest the 
extra cash to value-creating projects. During the financial crisis, the distressed firms use a larger part of 
their cash holdings to cover debt and interest expense than before the crisis. Even though financial 
constraints do not necessarily indicate vulnerability to distress, I argument that the shareholders of 
constrained firms expect larger part of cash holdings to be used to cover debt and interest expense 
leading to a wealth transfer between shareholders and debtholders. With the reasons presented above, 
I expect that the value of cash should decrease for firms facing financial constraints during the financial 
crisis. 
Ivashina & Scharfstein (2008) examined the impact of bank lending during the financial crisis. They find, 
that new loans fell by 37% to large firms during the peak period of financial crisis. As Hadlock & Pierce 
(2010) argue, size is an important factor to measure constraints. Thus, as large firms did not have to cut 
on feasible investments as harshly as smaller firms, the value of marginal cash should increase for 
unconstrained firms during the crisis. Combining the arguments for constrained and unconstrained 
firms, I believe that my findings are contrary to the previous findings in the existing literature which do 
not include the crisis period. 
Hypothesis 3: The differences between the value of cash in constrained and unconstrained firms during 
the crisis is contrary compared to before the crisis 
As Almeida et al. (2004) present, the financially constrained firms face more cuts on investments than 
unconstrained firms during the crisis. The effects of an economic crisis are therefore different for 
constrained and unconstrained firms. As the markets calm down and the crisis is conquered, the effects 
of having financial constraints should return to original levels. Constrained firms have lower incentive 
to hold on to cash as future is not as uncertain, they can take on attractive investments and lesser 
portion of cash holdings is used to cover debt and interest expense. As the bank lending increases after 
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the crisis period, the unconstrained firms have easier access to external capital leading to lower value 
of extra cash. 
Hypothesis 4: After the financial crisis the value of cash for constrained and unconstrained firms returns 
to the levels before the crisis. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Initial Data and Methods 
In this thesis, I use COMPUSTAT as the source of firm-level data. I use CRSP for the stock returns data. 
The data is for all listed companies in the United States from New York Stock Exchange, American Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ-NMS Stock Market, Boston Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, Pacific 
Exchange and Philadelphia Exchange. The sample period in this paper is from 2001 to 2015. All firm-
years contain 12-month fiscal-year end data for the respective firm. Benchmark portfolio returns are 
from Kenneth. R. French’s web page.  
Following earlier literature (e.g. Tong, 2007) I exclude all financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999) and utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999). I also exclude all firm-years with missing 
financial information. As the variables measure the changes of certain characteristics and are scaled 
with the 1-year lagged market value of equity, I also exclude all firm-years which do not have data for 
year t-1. Also, following Faulkender & Wang’s (2006) paper on the marginal value of cash, firm-years 
with negative net assets, negative market value of equity or negative dividends are excluded from this 
paper. After this, I trim the bottom and top 1% tails of firm-specific factors and left-hand side variable 
using the full sample to avoid distortions and outliers in the data. Finally, after the exclusions my sample 
contains 2679 firms with 25720 firm-year observations. 
In this paper, I follow the methods of Faulkender & Wang (2006) for measuring the marginal value of 
cash holdings. My baseline regression is as follows: 
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Each variable is conducted for each firm i for each firm-year t. This regression essentially represents a 
long-run event study. I interpret the regression results as the marginal value of an extra dollar for 
shareholders. 
3.2 The Dependent Variable 
Throughout my paper, I use excess stock returns (Ri,t - RBi,t ) for the firm i during fiscal year t as the left-
hand side variable in my regressions. Ri,t is defined as the stock i’s return over fiscal year t-1 to t. Stock 
returns are from CRSP tapes. I use the 25 Fama and French portfolios as the benchmark portfolios. The 
benchmark portfolios are formed by size and book-to-market and are computed to represent the 12-
month value-weighted return at the end of each fiscal year. For each year, all firms are grouped into 
one of the benchmark portfolios based on the intersection between size and book-to-market. As these 
benchmark portfolios are originally grouped from New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), I first group all 
stocks from the respective stock exchange into 5 size and 5 market-to-book groups. To avoid grouping 
firms from different stock exchanges into wrong groups, the breakpoints of the NYSE quintiles are used 
to assign the firm-year to the right group. The excess return is then simply conducted by subtracting 
the return of the benchmark portfolio from the realized return of the stock.  
3.3 Independent Variables 
Following earlier literature, I first define the unexpected change in variable X (∆X) as the realized 
change. All independent variables except the leverage are scaled with the 1-year lagged market value 
of equity of firm i (𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1). According to Faulkender & Wang, (2006) these deflations are conducted to 
avoid the largest firms dominate the results.  Market value of equity is defined as the number of shares 
times the stocks’s closing price at the end of fiscal-year. Ci,t is cash holdings defined as cash and short-
term investments. Ei,t is earnings defined as earnings before extraordinary items. NAi,t  is net assets 
defined as total assets minus cash holdings. R&Di,t is research and development expense. Ii,t is total 
interest and related expense. Di,t is Dividends Common/Ordinary. Ci,t-1 is the 1-year lagged cash and 
short-term investments. Li,t is market leverage defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and 
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market value of equity. NFi,t is new financing defined as the sum of common and preferred stock sold 
and long-term debt issuance minus the sum of purchase of common and preferred stock and reduction 
of long-term debt. Two interaction terms are included in the baseline regression. First one, 
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
∗
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
, is included to capture the effects of changes in the marginal value of cash holdings for different 
levels of cash holdings. Second one, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
, is included to capture the effects of changes in the 
marginal value of cash for different levels of leverage. More about the variables are presented in 
Appendix. 
3.4 The Financial Crisis  
As this paper examines how the value of an extra dollar for shareholders has changed during and after 
the financial crisis, I define the whole sample period into three sub-periods. Acharya et al. (2011) 
defines the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. Therefore, I create a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm-
year is 2007 or after and 0 if the firm-year is before 2007. As I expect the marginal value of cash to 
increase during the financial crisis period and decrease after the crisis, I also introduce a second dummy 
variable. After Financial Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates on 2010 or 
later and 0 if the observation dates on 2006 or earlier. These periods are tested in two separate 
regressions. First one includes the period before the financial crisis and during financial crisis. The 
second one includes the period before the financial crisis and after the financial crisis. Therefore, in this 
second regression, the firm-years between 2007 and 2009 are excluded. 
Moreover, I include an interaction dummy for both dummy variables presented above to present the 
interaction between the periods and the change in cash holdings. Financial Crisis * ∆Cash Holdings is 
included in the first regression to examine the changes in the marginal value of cash for shareholders 
before the financial crisis and during the financial crisis. In the second regression, the interaction term 
After Financial Crisis * ∆Cash Holdings examines the same effect before the crisis and after the crisis. 
Both dummy variables are included in the respective regressions to ensure that the estimated 
coefficient of interaction terms are due to the interaction and not due to crisis or its aftermath itself. 
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3.5 Financial Constraints 
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, I analyze the firms that are measured to have differing financial 
constraints than others. I study the effects of financial crisis in two different regressions. First one 
includes firm-years before the financial crisis and during the financial crisis. The second one includes 
firm-years during and after the financial crisis. Hadlock & Pierce (2010) discuss criteria for financial 
constraints in their paper “New evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints: Moving Beyond the KZ 
Index”. They find that many of the widely used indexes and variables to determine financial constraints 
correlate poorly with actual constraints. Hadlock & Pierce (2010) suggest that researchers should rely 
solely on two exogenous characteristics: firm size and age. Differing from earlier literature (e.g. Denis 
& Sibilkov, 2010 and Faulkender & Wang, 2006), I do not study the financial constraints for firms 
through payout policy or bond rating variables as Hadlock & Pierce (2010) find them to be insignificant 
if age and size are controlled. Two alternative schemes are presented below. 
1. Size: Large firms are more likely to be have fewer financial constraints, as they are better known 
and tend to have easier access to capital markets. Consistent with Hadlock & Pierce (2010), size 
is measured with the logarithm of total assets. For each year all firm-years are ranked by the 
fiscal-year end logarithm of total assets. Finally, I assign the firm-years into unconstrained 
(constrained) groups whose size is greater (less) than or equal to the logarithm of total assets in 
the top (bottom) three deciles of annual size group. 
2. Age: Carreira & Silva (2012) argue that older firms have more information available to potential 
lenders than younger firms. This leads younger firms to face more financial constraints. In this 
paper, I define age as the years the company has been public. For each firm-year, I subtract the 
year for which the initial public offering (IPO) dates from the year of the observation. Similar to 
the previous paragraph, I assign the firm-years to the unconstrained (constrained) groups whose 
age is more (less) than or equal to the age in the top (bottom) three deciles. 
These hypotheses are essentially tested with sub-samples, because only three bottom and top deciles 
are assigned into groups of unconstrained and constrained firms. To test the effects of the financial 
crisis and the changes in the marginal value of cash, I introduce a triple interaction term Financial Crisis 
* Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings. This presents the different effect of the crisis to constrained firm’s 
value of extra dollar compared to unconstrained firm. The Constrained variable is a dummy variable 
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that equals 1 if the firm is distinguished as a firm with financial constraints and 0 if the firm is 
distinguished as financially unconstrained firm. The dummy is also included as a separate variable in 
the regressions.  Another interaction term, Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings is included in the regression 
to present the difference of an extra dollar for the constrained and unconstrained firm before the start 
of financial crisis. Finally, the interaction term Financial Crisis * Constrained is introduced to the 
regressions. All other variables and interaction terms presented in the baseline regression and sections 
3,.2 & 3.3 are also included. To test the changes after the financial crisis, the Financial Crisis dummy is 
replaced with After Financial Crisis dummy. All other above variables remain the same. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, I report the results for the regressions. First, I examine how the value of cash has changed 
for the mean firm in the U.S. during the financial crisis and after the financial crisis compared to before 
the crisis. Subsequently, I examine how the marginal value of cash has changed for the constrained and 
unconstrained firms during the financial crisis and after the financial crisis. Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
examine all four hypotheses presented earlier, respectively. 
The main objective of my thesis is to examine the impact of financial crisis to the marginal value of a 
dollar for the shareholders. Following earlier literature, an extra dollar in cash is expected to affect the 
firm’s excess return through the change in cash holdings and the interaction terms.  
I use the following formula to conduct the marginal value of an extra dollar to shareholders: 
= ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑋 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ) + (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑋 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) 
Where ∆Cash is the change in Cash Holdings presented in the regression results. Cashinter is the 
coefficient of the interaction term ∆Cash Holdings * Cash Holdingst-1 and Leverageinter is the coefficient 
of the interaction term Leverage * ∆Cash Holdings. Mean cash is the mean Cash Holdings of the sample 
presented in the summary statistic tables. Mean leverage is also presented in the summary statistics. 
4.1 The Value of Cash for the Average U.S. Firm During the Crisis 
To test whether the marginal value of cash has changed during the financial crisis, I use the summary 
statistics presented in Table 1 columns 3 and 4 and the regression results presented in Table 2 columns 
2 and 3. Consistent with Faulkender & Wang (2006), I find that increase in leverage and cash holdings 
10 
 
does decrease the marginal value of cash for shareholders. This is indicated by the negative coefficients 
of the interaction terms. I find that before the financial crisis, the marginal value of an extra dollar is 
1,271$ for a firm with zero debt and zero cash holdings. Moreover, the positive coefficient (0,126) of 
the interaction term Financial Crisis * ∆Cash Holdings indicates that during the financial crisis an extra 
dollar is worth 12,6 cents more if the other characteristics remain on the same levels. The coefficient is 
significant at 5% level. With the summary statistics of Table 1 column 2 and 3 I find that during the 
financial crisis, the cash levels and leverage have increased. Combining the means of Table 1 and 
coefficients of Table 2, I conclude that before the financial crisis the marginal value of an extra dollar 
for the mean firm is valued at $1,17 (= 1,271 + (-0,284 * 0,155) + (-0,649 * 0,168) by the shareholders. 
During the crisis the marginal value of an extra dollar for the mean firm is $1,21 (=1,271 + 0,126 + (-
0,284 * 0,192) + (-0,649 * 0,206). The coefficients of the two interaction terms used in the calculations 
are both significant at 1%. These results are consistent with the first hypothesis. As emphasized in 
section 2, I argument this to be the result of the more restricted access to capital markets during the 
financial crisis, the increase in short-term debt and lower expectations of future income streams. 
4.2 The Value of Cash for the Average U.S. Firm After the Crisis 
Moving on to examine the second hypothesis I use the same two tables for the summary statistics and 
regression results as in the previous section. From the third column of Table 2, I present that during 
year 2010-2015, the marginal value of cash has decreased for a firm with zero debt and zero cash 
holdings. Note, that the negative coefficient (-0,193) of the interaction term After Financial Crisis * 
∆Cash Holdings indicates that the marginal value of cash after the financial crisis is valued 19,3 cents 
lower than before the financial crisis. The coefficient is significant at 1% level. Likewise, the interaction 
terms are also both significant at 1% level. For the average firm, the shareholders value an extra dollar 
at only $0,89 (=1,28 + (-0,193) + (-0,323 * 0,196) + (-0,694 * 0,190) after the financial crisis. These results 
are consistent with my second hypothesis. 
From Table 1 column 4 it is noteworthy to emphasize the mean of 1-year lag of cash holdings and 
leverage of the after financial crisis period. There is an increase in the variables compared to column 2 
which presents the respective variables for the period 2001-2006. Consistent with the findings of 
Faulkender & Wang (2006) it is reasonable to argue that the increase in cash holdings and leverage do 
have a negative impact for the marginal value of cash. I argument, that the decrease in the marginal 
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value of cash is partly due to the abnormal cash holdings held by the firms, which Pinkowitz et al. (2013) 
also point out. Also, as shown in Table 1, an average U.S. public company has nearly doubled their New 
Financing after the crisis compared to the period before the crisis. As there are not significant changes 
in research and development activity or net assets, I argue that these companies are hoarding cash 
which is not relevant for their investment activity. Therefore, I suggest that shareholders see the firms 
piling on excess cash and thus, not valuing additional corporate cash holdings as high as before the 
financial crisis. Also, as suggested earlier, short-term debt decreases after the crisis leading to lower 
value of cash holdings. 
 
Table 1 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for 3 different sample periods. Columns named (B) are statistics 
for the sample period before the financial crisis from 2001 to 2006. Columns named (F) are statistics 
for the sample period during the financial crisis 2007-2009. Columns named (A) are statistics for the 
sample period after the financial crisis 2010-2015. All of the variables, except Ri,t, Excess Return and 
leverage are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of equity. Details on the variables are presented 
in section 3.2 and Appendix. 
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Table 2 
This table presents the regression results for 2 different regressions. Columns 2 and 3 present the 
coefficients and p-values for the sample period 2001-2009 which examines the impacts of financial 
crisis to the marginal value of cash. Columns 4 and 5 present the coefficients and p-values for the 
sample periods 2001-2006 & 2010-2015. The first regression includes 1869 firms and 13119 firm-years 
and the second includes 2677 firms and 20671 firm-years. The dependent variable is Excess Return 
defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡. Financial Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates 
between years 2007-2009 and 0 if the observation dates between years 2001-2006. After Financial 
Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates between 2010-2015 and 0 if the 
observation dates between years 2001-2006. All of the variables, except leverage and the dummy 
variables, are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of equity.  Details on the variables are presented 
in section 3.2 and Appendix. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the p-value is significant at 0,05% or lower. 
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4.3 The Value of Cash for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms During the Crisis 
To test the third hypothesis; whether the shareholders’ value extra cash differently for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms due to the crisis, I present the regression results and summary 
statistics for financially unconstrained and constrained firms in this section. I have conducted separate 
regressions for both the size and age criteria for financial constraints. I present them in table 5. Second 
and fourth column presents the coefficients and p-values for firms grouped by their size and the sixth 
and eighth column presents the results for firms grouped by their age, respectively. Moreover, I present 
the summary statistics for firms distinguished as financially unconstrained in table 3 and for constrained 
firms in table 4. The summary statistics combine the respective statistics of age and size grouped deciles 
by taking the mean of these two. The reason for this is the closely similar results of both individual 
summary statistics.  
Summary statistic tables for both constrained and unconstrained firms show an increase in the 1-year 
lag of cash holdings during the crisis compared to before the crisis. However, contrary to constrained 
firms, unconstrained firms increase their cash holdings even after the financial crisis.  
Consistent with the results of section 4.1, the coefficients Financial Crisis * ∆Cash Holdings shows a 
positive impact of Financial Crisis to the marginal value of cash in both regressions significant at 1% 
level. Consistent with the results of Faulkender & Wang (2006), before the financial crisis the interaction 
term Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings indicates a positive premium for firms with financial constraints. 
However, the indicated coefficient in the size regression is not significant contrary to the positive 
coefficient of 0,329 in the age regression which is significant at 1% level. 
Both the age and size regressions indicate a strong negative impact of the triple interaction term 
Financial Crisis * Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings for constrained firm. In the size-regression this 
coefficient implies that for constrained firms, extra cash is valued 69 cents less during the financial crisis. 
This coefficient is significant at 1% level. The age-regression implies a lesser impact; cash is valued 30,8 
cents less with significance at 5% level. However, combined with the positive coefficients of Financial 
Crisis * ∆Cash Holdings I find that during the financial crisis, the marginal value of cash for constrained 
firm is still above its book value. Combining the summary statistics with the regression results, I find 
that for the average constrained firm, an extra dollar is worth $1,22 (=1,25 + 0,076 + (-0,225*0,221) + 
(-0,432 * 0,125)) before the crisis and $1,08 (=1,25 + 0,076 + (-0,69) + 0,57 + (-0,225 * 0,253)+(-0,432 * 
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0,158)) during the crisis if grouped by size. The corresponding values are $1,20 and $1,24  if grouped by 
age. 
For a firm that is distinguished as unconstrained, the marginal value of cash is $1,13 (=1,250 + (-0,225 
* 0,122) + (-0,432 * 0,216)) before the crisis and $1.68 during the crisis if grouped by size. The respective 
values are $0,86 and $1.39 if grouped by age. 
The subtraction of interaction terms Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings and Financial Crisis * Constrained * 
∆Cash Holdings presents the difference between the marginal value of cash in financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms, if the baseline is the period during the financial crisis. Therefore, a constrained 
firm’s extra dollar is valued $0,61 dollars less than unconstrained firm’s extra dollar if grouped by size. 
To conclude this sub-section, the marginal value of cash has increased for the unconstrained firms with 
mostly significant results. However, the results suggest that for constrained firms the increase in the 
value of cash has been modest or even negative during the financial crisis. I argue that the large 
difference between the value of cash between these companies are the results of the constrained firms 
need to postpone investments and their vulnerability to distress. As the investments were not 
postponed due to lack of capital, an extra dollar is valued lower for constrained firms in the time of 
crisis.  Also, as the constrained firms are more vulnerable to distress, larger part of incoming cash was 
believed to be used to cover debt and interest expense. Therefore, I argument that an extra dollar for 
a constrained firm was not as valuable as for unconstrained firms during the crisis.  
4.4 The Value of Cash for Constrained and Unconstrained Firms After the Crisis 
This sub-section presents the results of changes in the value of cash for financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms after the financial crisis. The previous sub-section emphasized that an extra dollar 
is valued higher if the firm is financially unconstrained during the financial crisis. To test whether this is 
just due to the crisis and not a permanent change, I examine the value of cash for unconstrained and 
constrained firms after the financial crisis compared to during the financial crisis. Thus, the After 
Financial Crisis dummy equals 1 if the observation dates to or after 2010 and 0 if the observation dates 
before 2010. All interaction terms in the previous sub-section containing the dummy Financial Crisis are 
replaced with the After Financial Crisis dummy. The summary statistics are presented in Tables 4 and 
5, similarly to previous section. The regression results are presented in Table 6. 
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In table 6, columns 2 and 4 I find that the interaction term ∆Cash Holdings * Cash Holdingst-1 is not 
significant at 10% level in the size regression, which might give a slight distortion to the results for the 
marginal value of cash for the mean firm. However, all the needed coefficients to examine the relative 
changes are significant at 1 % level. Thus, I present significant results for a firm with no debt and zero 
cash holdings.  Moreover, as the regression results for the age group shows few insignificancies in the 
variables in the After Financial Crisis interaction terms, I focus on the size group in this section. 
Consistent with the results of sections 4.1 and 4.2 a dollar is valued 68,7 cents less after the financial 
crisis compared to during the financial crisis. The highly negative coefficient of the interaction term 
Constrained * ∆Cash Holdingst-1 presents that during the financial crisis, firms with financial constraints 
have a lower value for an extra dollar. However, the triple interaction term After Financial Crisis * 
Constrained * ∆Cash Holdings suggests, that after the crisis the equity market places a premium for an 
extra dollar in constrained firms.  Considering an unconstrained firm with zero cash holdings and no 
debt, the marginal value of a dollar is $1,549 during the financial crisis and $0,86 (=1,549 + (-0,687)) 
after the financial crisis. The respective values for a constrained firm are $0,88 (=1,549 +(-0,079) + (-
0,591)) during the crisis and $1,153 after the crisis. These results are consistent with the fourth 
hypothesis and the changes in the value of cash for constrained and unconstrained firms during the 
crisis are only temporary. This is consistent with the findings of Faulkender & Wang (2006), Denis & 
Sibilkov (2009) and Tong (2011). After the financial crisis, the shareholders of constrained firms place a 
premium for an extra dollar contrary to shareholders of unconstrained firms.  
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Table 3 
This table presents the summary statistics of each variable for firms distinguished as financially 
unconstrained. This table merges both size and age grouped unconstrained firms’ summary statistic by 
taking the mean of the respective statistics.  Columns with the header (B) presents the statistics for 
firms before the financial crisis 2001-2006. Columns with the headers (F) and (A) presents the respective 
statistics for firms during the financial crisis 2007-2009 and after the financial crisis 2010-2015, 
respectively.  All the variables, except Ri,t, Excess Return and leverage are scaled by the 1-year lagged 
market value of equity. Details on the variables are presented in section 3.2, section 3.5 and Appendix. 
 
Table 4 
This table presents the summary statistics of each variable for firms distinguished with financial 
constraints. This table merges both size and age grouped unconstrained firms summary statistics by 
taking the mean of the respective statistics.  Columns with the header (B) presents the statistics for 
firms before the financial crisis 2001-2006. Columnswith the headers (F) and (A) presents the respective 
statistics for firms during the financial crisis 2007-2009 and after the financial crisis 2010-2015, 
respectively.  All the variables, except Ri,t, Excess Return and leverage are scaled by the 1-year lagged 
market value of equity. Details on the variables are presented in section 3.2, section 3.5 and Appendix. 
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Table 5 
This table presents the regression results for financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms 
before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, the sample period is 2001-2009. Columns 2 and 4 
presents the coefficients and p-values for the independent variables if the firm is distinguished as 
constrained/unconstrained by the size of the firm. Columns 6 and 8 presents the respective values for 
constrained and unconstrained firms distinguished by the age of the firm. The dependent variable is 
Excess Return defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡. Financial crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
observation dates to or after 2007 and 0 if observation dates before 2007. The first regression includes 
1321 firms and 7882 firm-years and the second includes 1307 firms and 8289 firm-years. All the 
variables, except leverage and the dummy variables, are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of 
equity. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the p-value is significant at 0,05 % or lower. More about the 
variables in section 3.2, section 3.5 and Appendix. 
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Table 6 
This table presents the regression results for financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms 
during and after the financial crisis. Therefore, the sample period is 2007-2015. Columns 2 and 4 
presents the coefficients and p-values for the independent variables if the firm is distinguished as 
constrained/unconstrained by the size of the firm. Columns 6 and 8 presents the respective values for 
constrained and unconstrained firms distinguished by the age of the firm. The dependent variable is 
Excess Return defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡.  After Financial crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
observation dates to or after 2010 and 0 if observation dates before 2010. The first regression includes 
1899 firms and 10596 firm-years and the second includes 2290 firms and 11138 firm-years. All the 
variables, except leverage and the dummy variables, are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of 
equity. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the p-value is significant at 0,05 % or lower. More about the 
variables in section 3.2, section 3.5 and Appendix. 
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5. Alternative Methods to Address Robustness 
So far, my regressions have studied how market reacts to the unexpected changes in cash holdings. In 
this section, I repeat my analysis using the change in excess cash holdings instead of change in cash 
holdings as Faulkender & Wang (2006) show that the benchmark return should already reflect the 
average increase in cash holdings. In this paper, I follow the methods of Faulkender & Wang (2006) to 
assign the excess cash for each firm. For each year, I conduct the average change in cash for each of the 
25 Fama and French benchmark portfolios and subtract the results from each firm’s realized change in 
cash. According to Tong (2011), this method also reduces the impact of the time trend. All the robust 
tests show similar results to the main tests. Moreover, most of the coefficients are significant similarly 
to the main tests’ coefficients. 
Table 7 presents the results of the robustness check for the marginal value of cash for the average firm 
during and after the financial crisis. The results are consistent with the main tests. However, the 
interaction term Financial Crisis * ∆Excess Cash Holdings loses its significance although it still shows a 
positive sign for the coefficient. The second regression shows a significant coefficient for the interaction 
term of After Financial Crisis and ∆Excess Cash Holdings indicating that after the crisis a dollar is valued 
19.9 cents less than before the crisis.  
Table 8 and 9 presents the results for robust tests for the constrained and unconstrained during and 
after the financial crisis, respectively. The results are consistent with my main tests. Table 8 indicates 
that during the crisis a financially constrained firm’s excess dollar is valued at 58.4 cents less compared 
to unconstrained firm if grouped by size and if debt and level of cash holdings are ignored. The age 
group also presents a negative, although a more modest effect of the crisis to constrained firms. Table 
9 also presents consistent results with the main tests. The triple interaction terms show significant 
positive coefficients indicating that the value of cash has increased for constrained firms after the crisis 
compared to unconstrained firms.  
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Table 7 
This table presents the regression results for 2 different regressions. Columns 2 and 3 present the 
coefficients and p-values for the sample period 2001-2009 which examines the impacts of financial 
crisis to the marginal value of excess cash. Columns 4 and 5 present the coefficients and p-values for 
the sample periods 2001-2006 & 2010-2015. The first regression includes 1869 firms and 13119 firm-
years and the second includes 2677 firms and 20671 firm-years. The dependent variable is Excess 
Return defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡. ∆Excess Cash Holdings is the 1-year realized change in cash and short-
term investments minus the average 1-year change in cash of the average firm in the corresponding 
benchmark portfolio. Financial Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates between 
years 2007-2009 and 0 if the observation dates between years 2001-2006. After Financial Crisis is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates between 2010-2015 and 0 if the observation 
dates between years 2001-2006. All variables, except leverage and the dummy variables, are scaled by 
the 1-year lagged market value of equity.  Details on the variables are presented in section 3.2 and 
Appendix. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the p-value is significant at 0,05 % or lower.  
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Table 8 
This table presents the regression results for financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms 
before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, the sample period is 2001-2009. Columns 2 and 4 
presents the coefficients and p-values if the firm is distinguished as constrained/unconstrained by the 
size of the firm. Columns 6 and 8 presents the respective values for constrained and unconstrained 
firms distinguished by the age of the firm. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡. ∆Excess Cash Holdings is the 1-year realized change in cash and short-term investments minus 
the average 1-year change in cash of the average firm in the corresponding benchmark portfolio.  
Financial crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates to or after 2007 and 0 if 
observation dates before 2007. The first regression includes 1321 firms and 7882 firm-years and the 
second includes 1407 firms and 8289 firm-years. All of the variables, except leverage and the dummy 
variables, are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of equity. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the 
p-value is significant at 0,05 % or lower. More about the variables in sections 3.2 & 3.5 and Appendix 
A. 
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Table 9 
This table presents the regression results for financially unconstrained and financially constrained firms 
during and after the financial crisis. Therefore, the sample period is 2007-2015. Columns 3 and 4 
presents the coefficients and p-values if the firm is distinguished as constrained/unconstrained by the 
size of the firm. Columns 4 and 5 presents the respective values for constrained and unconstrained 
firms distinguished by the age of the firm. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑅𝐵𝑖,𝑡.  ∆Excess Cash Holdings is the 1-year realized change in cash and short-term investments minus 
the average 1-year change in cash of the average firm in the corresponding benchmark portfolio. After 
Financial crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation dates to or after 2010 and 0 if 
observation dates before 2010. The first regression includes 1899 firms and 10596 firm-years and the 
second includes 2290 firms and 11138 firm-years. All of the variables, except leverage and the dummy 
variables, are scaled by the 1-year lagged market value of equity.  Details on the variables are presented 
in section 3.2 and Appendix A. A P-value of 0,000 presents that the p-value is significant at 0,05 % or 
lower. More about the variables in section 3.2, section 3.5 and Appendix A. 
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis has contributed to the existing literature by examining the marginal value of corporate cash 
for shareholders during and after the financial crisis (2007-2009) in the United States. Moreover, I have 
examined how the crisis and its aftermath have affected the marginal value of cash for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Throughout the study, I have followed the methodology of 
Faulkender & Wang (2006) for my regressions.  
Consistent with my first hypothesis, I find that the marginal value of cash has increased during the 
financial crisis of 2008. In my main test, I find that for a company with zero debt and no cash holdings, 
an extra dollar is worth 12,6 cents more during the crisis. For an average company, the value of cash 
has increased 4 cents. The reason why the increase for the average firm is not as large is the increased 
mean cash holdings and mean leverage which balances the crisis effects. I see the increase in the value 
of cash as a result of impaired access to capital markets, increase in short-term debt and the lower 
future expectations of income streams by shareholders leading them to place a premium to extra cash. 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the marginal of value of cash has since decreased below the levels of 
the period before the crisis. The regression results present a significant decrease of 19,3 cent after the 
crisis. I argument this to be the mostly due to the result of increase in abnormal cash holdings, decrease 
in value-creating investment opportunities and the declined competition in the United States. The 
robust tests indicate similar, although slightly more modest, results in the first two tests. 
In this thesis, I have also presented that the marginal value of cash decreased for financially constrained 
firms during the financial crisis compared to unconstrained firms. However, after the crisis the value of 
an extra dollar for unconstrained firms has decreased whereas for constrained firms the value has 
increased. Additional tests with excess cash seem to present similar results. As Campello et al. (2010) 
emphasized, constrained firms had to at least postpone investment projects and cut on capital 
spending. Because of this the shareholders might have believed that an extra dollar is not going to be 
used to create value inside the company. Also, related to the previous reason, constrained firms are 
more vulnerable to distress. Combined with harder access to capital markets, larger portion of cash was 
believed to be used to cover debt and interest expense leading to a wealth transfer from shareholders 
to debtholders. However, the effects were only temporary and since the end of the financial crisis, the 
situation has standardized and the results after the crisis are similar to existing literature. 
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